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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 43 1998 NUMBER 5
Issues in the Third Circuit
CIRCUMVENTING THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN THE THIRD
CIRCUIT: COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK v. FLORIDA PREPAID
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION EXPENSE BOARD AND
RELATED CASE LAW
I. INTRODUCrION
A T first blush, the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution appears clear.1 The Amendment provides
that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." 2 Despite this relatively simple language, the inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment has been neither clear nor consis-
tent.3 Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion in Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways and Public Transportation:4
1. See Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce
Clause, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 3, 4 (1997) ("To the ordinary observer, the text of the
Eleventh Amendment seems to pose few interpretational problems .... ."); Katha-
fine F. Nelson, Resolving Native American Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment:
Changing the Balance of Power, 39 VILL. L. REv. 525, 591 (1994) (noting that Elev-
enth Amendment contains "seemingly simple wording").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3. See Daniel J. Cloherty, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Rec-
ognizing the Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82
CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1297 (1994) (characterizing sovereign immunity principles as
"'doctrinal obstacle course"' (quoting Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1480 (1987))); Field, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that Eleventh
Amendment meaning has changed over time); Nelson, supra note 1, at 591 (find-
ing Eleventh Amendment to be continuing source of debate); Peter A. Schwartz,
Suing States After Seminole, 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, 2 (1997) (finding Eleventh
Amendment law to be "muddled"); T. Barton French,Jr., Note, The Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act and the Eleventh Amendment: States Assert Sovereign Immunity Defense to
Slow the Growth of Indian Gaming, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 735, 756 (1993) (noting that
courts have wrestled with "unsettled doctrine of the states' sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment"); Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Comment, Fed-
eral Courts-Indians: The Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe: Reinvigorating the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 73 N.D. L. Rv. 517, 522 (1996) (noting that Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence is often inconsistent and conflicting).
4. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
(923)
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"[B]y the late twentieth century the law of the Eleventh Amend-
ment exhibited a baffling complexity .... The case law of the
eleventh amendment is replete with historical anomalies, inter-
nal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions. Marked by its his-
tory as were few other branches of constitutional law,
interpretation of the Amendment has become an arcane spe-
cialty of lawyers and federal judges."5
Despite the Amendment's clear language, courts have interpreted it to
prohibit suits in federal court against an unconsenting state not only by
"Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State[s]" and by "Citizens of another
State," but also by a state's own citizens. 6 The Amendment does not, how-
ever, apply to suits against states by the federal government.7 The protec-
tions afforded to the states against suits in federal court have also been
extended to "arms of the state," such as some state agencies. 8 These pro-
tections that the states and their arms enjoy, however, are not absolute. In
certain situations, Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, 9 or the states themselves may waive this immunity. 10
This Casebrief summarizes the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit's current interpretation of the abrogation and waiver theo-
ries of Eleventh Amendment immunity in light of its recent decision in
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board."l Part II discusses when Congress may constitutionally abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and summarizes the Third Cir-
5. Id. at 520 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)
(noting that unconsenting state is immune from suit in federal court by its own
citizens); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (holding that states are immune
under Eleventh Amendment from suits in federal court by their own citizens).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (determining that
states consented to suit in federal court by United States upon entering into
Union); see also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106
YALE L.J. 1683, 1706 (1996) (noting that states are not immune from suit in federal
court by United States); Andrew S. Williamson, Note, Policing the States After Semi-
nole, 85 GEO. L.J. 1739, 1759 (1997) (same).
8. For a discussion of the "arm of the state" doctrine, see infra notes 74-85,
114-22 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the abrogation doctrine, see infra notes 17-45, 86-98 and
accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of how a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, see infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
11. 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1999) (No. 98-149). This Casebrief does not address suits against state officials in
federal court to enforce federal law through prospective injunctive and declaratory
relief under the Ex parte Young exception. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 127
(1908) (establishing exception to states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in
federal court).
924 [Vol. 43: p. 923
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cuit's current abrogation analysis in College Savings Bank.12 Part II also ana-
lyzes the Third Circuit's current approach to the doctrine of constructive
waiver, which the court solidified in College Savings Bank.13 In addition,
Part II summarizes the Third Circuit's approach to determining which
arms of the state are entitled to assert a state's Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. 14 Part III analyzes what arguments and approaches are most likely
to succeed in the Third Circuit when Eleventh Amendment abrogation,
waiver and arm of the state issues arise. 15 Finally, Part IV notes that the
Eleventh Amendment can pose a significant obstacle to bringing suit in
federal court, but concludes that the Third Circuit has left open ample
means by which litigants can circumvent this Eleventh Amendment bar.
16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Congress' Power to Abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Prior to 1996, the United States Supreme Court recognized that Con-
gress could validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
when it legislated pursuant to either the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Interstate Commerce Clause. 17 In 1996, the Supreme Court redefined
Congress' power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida.18 "This hotly contested five-to-four ruling was im-
mediately viewed as a drastic curtailment of congressional authority over
state action . "19
12. For a discussion of Congress' abrogation power with respect to the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, see infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of how a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, see infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to the arm of the state
doctrine, see infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. Although the arm of the
state doctrine is more like a factually intensive ad hoc analysis rather than the
dynamic and changing doctrinal area covering waiver and abrogation, it is worth
summarizing the Third Circuit's approach to the analysis because neither waiver
nor abrogation analyses are necessary unless a state entity can claim the state's
Eleventh Amendment protection. See L. Pahl Zinn, Note, Hess v. Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corporation: Erosion of the Eleventh Amendment, 1995 DET. C.L. Rxv.
1417, 1456 ("[A]rm-of-the-state doctrine determines whether immunity exists,
whereas waiver and abrogation are only relevant if immunity exists.").
15. For a discussion of these arguments and approaches, see infra notes 86-
122 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the conclusions of this Casebrief, see infra notes 123-25
and accompanying text.
17. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (holding that
Congress could validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when leg-
islating pursuant to Interstate Commerce Clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress could validly abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when legislating under section Five of Fourteenth
Amendment).
18. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
19. Williamson, supra note 7, at 1739; see Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Votes to
Limit Some Federal Suits Against States, WALL ST.J., Mar. 28, 1996, at B1O (noting that
3
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Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,20 the statute at issue in
Seminole Tribe, Congress granted Indian tribes the right to sue the states in
federal court.21 The Supreme Court, however, held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred these congressionally authorized suits. 22 In so hold-
ing, the Court reiterated the basic constitutional principle that "Congress
may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity if it has 'unequivocally ex-
pressed its intent to abrogate the immunity' and has acted 'pursuant to a
valid exercise of power."' 23
The Court in Seminole Tribe prefaced its ruling by noting that "no prin-
cipled distinction could be drawn between" the Indian Commerce Clause
and the Interstate Commerce Clause.2 4 Although the Court found that
the language in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act "unequivocally"
demonstrated Congress' intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity, it also found that Congress had not acted "pursuant to a
valid exercise of power."2 5 The Court rejected its prior holding that Con-
gress could abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant
to Commerce Clause legislation.26 Thus, following Seminole Tribe, section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provided the sole means by which
Congress could abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.2 7
United States Supreme Court "took another dramatic step in curtailing congres-
sional authority in favor of state power"); Joan Biskupic, High Court Bolsters State
Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (noting that Supreme Court handed states
"big victory"); Frank J. Murray, High Court Revives States' Rights Against Lawsuits,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (stating that "[t]he ruling dealt a blow to the
congressional practice of ignoring the 11 th Amendment by allowing claims against
the states in federal courts under certain circumstances"); David D. Savage, High
Court Curbs Federal Lawsuits Against the States, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at Al (not-
ing that ruling "broadly strengthened the powers of the states at the expense of the
federal courts").
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
21. See id. (affording Indian tribes right to sue individual states in federal
court). Under the act, the states were required to negotiate in good faith with a
tribe towards forming a gaming compact. See id. § 2710(d) (3) (A). The act re-
quired this compact before an Indian tribe could conduct certain gaming activi-
ties. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(C). Section (d)(7) granted the United States district
courts jurisdiction over causes of actions that arose "from the failure of a State to
enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe." Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i).
22. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 (holding that Eleventh Amendment pre-
vents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against unconsenting states
to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause).
23. Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
24. See id. at 62 (noting that Indian Commerce Clause transferred at least as
much authority to federal government from states as Interstate Commerce
Clause).
25. See id. at 57, 66 (overruling Union Gas and redefining abrogation
doctrine).
26. See id. at 66 (noting that Union Gas decision was "solitary departure from
established law").
27. See id. at 65-66 (stating that before Union Gas, Court had not recognized
any means other than Fourteenth Amendment through which Congress could ab-
rogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
926 [Vol. 43: p. 923
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Therefore, Congress can now only validly abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when (1) Congress unequivocally expresses its in-
tent to abrogate and (2) Congress legislates pursuant to its Fourteenth
Amendment power.
28
Recently, the Third Circuit has had several opportunities to interpret
the abrogation precedent of Seminole Tribe.29 One such case analyzing the
abrogation doctrine was College Savings Bank.30 College Savings Bank was
the first case in which the Third Circuit analyzed in any great depth the
28. See id. at 57-66 (determining when Congress can constitutionally abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
29. See In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998) (determin-
ing that Congress "unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity under the Bankruptcy Code," but finding no evidence
that Bankruptcy Code was Fourteenth Amendment legislation); College Sav. Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 357-61 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149) (finding that
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992 (TRCA), 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994),
clearly manifested Congress' intent to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity from suits under Lanham Act, but holding that TRCA protected no "prop-
erty right" protected under Fourteenth Amendment); Balgowan v. NewJersey, 115
F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1997) (determining that under teachings of Seminole Tribe,
court lacked jurisdiction to hear claims against New Jersey under Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)); Kish v. Verniero, 212 B.R. 808, 815-17
(D.N.J. 1997) (finding that Bankruptcy Code clearly evidenced Congress' intent to
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, but holding purported abroga-
tion was unconstitutional because Bankruptcy Code can not be construed as Four-
teenth Amendment legislation); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 427 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding
that "false advertising prong of Lanham Act does not implicate any of the substan-
tive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore cannot be the basis
for the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity"), affd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d
Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149). The
Third Circuit also addressed the abrogation doctrine prior to the Seminole Tribe
decision. See, e.g., Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir.
1996) (finding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994 & Supp. 1995), was valid congressional Fourteenth Amendment legislation,
but that Eleventh Amendment barred suit in federal courts against states because
statutory language "does not evince an unmistakably clear intention" by Congress
to abrogate states' immunity).
Most of the other courts of appeals have also applied the Seminole Tibe abroga-
tion test. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Board of Pub. Works, 138 F.3d 537, 539-40
(4th Cir. 1998) (applying Seminole Tribe abrogation analysis); Doe v. University of
Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 657-60 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Powell v. Florida, 132 F.3d
677, 678 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); Fernandez v. PNL Asset Management Co., 130
F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 36-39 (2d
Cir. 1997) (same); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1269-71 (9th Cir. 1997)
(same), cert. denied, Wilson v. Armstrong, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); Mills v. Maine,
118 F.3d 37, 41-49 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d 813, 814-17
(10th Cir. 1997) (same); Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dep't, 111 F.3d 585, 586-87
(8th Cir. 1997) (same); Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833,
837-42 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
30. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 353.
5
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abrogation doctrine in light of Seminole Tribe, and as a result, the court
solidified a means of approaching the abrogation issue. 31
In College Savings Bank, College Savings Bank sued the State of Flor-
ida, through Florida Prepaid, under the Lanham Act 32-the federal trade-
mark, copyright and unfair competition act. 33 The State of Florida
created Florida Prepaid as an entity to "market and sell tuition prepay-
ment programs designed to provide sufficient funds to cover future col-
lege expenses." 34 Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank competed
directly in this tuition prepayment market.3 5 In its suit against Florida
Prepaid, College Savings Bank alleged that Florida Prepaid had made mis-
statements about College Savings Bank's tuition plans and that these mis-
statements constituted unfair competition in contravention of the Lanham
Act.3
6
The Third Circuit began its abrogation analysis with the language of
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA).3 7 The court, after ana-
lyzing the language of the TRCA, concluded that it met the first require-
ment of the Seminole Tribe test by "manifest[ing] Congress' unambiguous
intent to abrogate the states' immunity. '38
Next, the College Savings Bank court analyzed whether the TRCA could
satisfy the second prong of the Seminole Tribe constitutional abrogation
test-whether the TRCA was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.39 Specifically, the Third Circuit addressed whether the TRCA could
31. See id. at 357-62 (finding no valid abrogation by Congress after meticulous
analysis of precedent, statute and relevant doctrines).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (1994 & Supp. 1996).




37. 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994); see College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 357 (addressing
first prong of Seminole Tribe two-part abrogation test). The TRCA abrogates the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Lanham Act. See id. at 357. The
TRCA "Waiver of sovereign immunity" provision provides:
Any State, instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State
or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not
be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from
suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or non-
governmental entity for any violation under this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994).
The pre-Seminole Tribe district court case of Unix System Laboratories v. Berkeley
Software, 832 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.J. 1993), had previously determined that the TRCA
was a valid abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity without the
aid of the Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe. See id. at 799 (noting that Congress had
eliminated states' immunity from suit under copyright and trademarik laws).
38. College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 357.
39. See id. at 358-62 (applying second prong of Seminole Tribe test to TRCA).
The court began its analysis with the congressional history of the statute, finding it
inconclusive. See id. at 358-59 (noting that legislative history did not establish that
TRCA was constitutional). The legislative history of the TRCA mentioned the
928 [Vol. 43: p. 923
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be construed to protect a right recognized by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. 40 The court determined that the Lanham Act
did protect some intangible property rights, but no such right was involved
in College Savings Bank.4 1 The Third Circuit framed the property right at
issue as "the right to be free of false advertising."42 The court concluded
that this intangible property fight was not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43 As a result, the court concluded that "in this case" the
TRCA could not be construed as being enacted pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment. 44 Thus, the court held that the TRCA, having failed
the second prong of the Seminole Tribe test, did not constitutionally abro-
gate Florida Prepaid's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 45
Fourteenth Amendment only once. See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094. The history provides that the TRCA "is justified
under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth [A]mendment." Id. The court
found this explanation of the constitutional basis for the act to be "brief," but
recognized that "Congress is not required to discuss or explain explicitly the con-
stitutional basis for laws that it enacts." College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 358 (citing
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
315 (1993); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
243-44 n.18 (1983)). Thus, the court concluded that the brief statement of the
constitutional foundation for the TRCA was entitled to deference, but did not es-
tablish that the TRCA was constitutional. See id. at 359 (finding that it was now
necessary to examine whether TRCA was valid under Fourteenth Amendment en-
forcement section).
40. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 359-61 (analyzing whether case involved
property right). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The court noted that the clause
itself "sets out the boundaries of what rights it protects." College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d
at 359. First, "the conduct must involve action by a state." Id. Second, "it must
deprive an individual of life, liberty or property." Id. Third and finally, "the depri-
vation must occur without due process of law." Id.
41. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 361 (finding no property right protected
"in this case").
42. Id. at 360.
43. See id. (determining that case does not involve property interest protected
by Fourteenth Amendment).
44. See id. at 361 (determining that TRCA was unconstitutional exercise of
Congress' power). The court specifically limited its holding to the facts in the case
and declined to determine whether the TRCA could "be applied constitutionally
in a case involving a trademark infringement or involving a misrepresentation
about a competitor's goods or services." Id. at 362.
45. See id. at 361 (finding TRCA to be "unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
powers" in this case).
7
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B. Constructive Waiver of the States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity
1. The Parden Doctrine: Constructive Waiver Through Participation in an
Area Regulated by Congressional Legislation
The doctrine of constructive consent by states to suit in federal court
has developed through a line of cases over the past three decades. 46 The
high point of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the doctrine was
Parden v. Terminal Railway.47 In Parden, the Supreme Court found that
Alabama had voluntarily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by op-
erating a railroad after the enactment of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act (FELA). 4 8 Thus, the Court concluded that a state could voluntarily
waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by participating in an area regu-
lated by Congress under an act that Congress intended to apply to the
states.
49
The Supreme Court modified and partially overruled Parden in the
years to follow.50 The first limitation on Parden was made in Employees of the
Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Wel-
fare.5 1 In Employees of the Department of Public Health, the Court formulated
the important government function exception to Parden.5 2 This exception
mandates that "a state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity if it
is engaged in an important or core government function."5 3 The Parden
ruling was further limited in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation.54 The Court in Welch determined that a Parden-type con-
46. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 408-10 (2d ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing development of constructive waiver doctrine).
47. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). One commentator has recognized Parden as the
"apex in Supreme Court development of the constructive consent doctrine." Sid-
ney M. Wolf, Killing the New Buffalo: State Eleventh Amendment Defense to Enforcement
oflGRA Indian Gaming Compacts, 47 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 51, 92 (1995).
48. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994); see Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 (finding that "Ala-
bama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years
after enactment of the FELA necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized
by that Act").
49. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 191-93 (finding that Alabama had constructively
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit).
50. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 362 (noting departure from Parden hold-
ing in subsequent Supreme Court decisions).
51. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
52. See College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 362-63 (commenting on Employees of the
Department of Public Health, which held that state cannot be held to have waived
Eleventh Amendment immunity where case involves operations of integral con-
cern to state).
53. Id. In Employees of the Department of Public Health, the Court distinguished
Parden by finding that state mental hospitals, state cancer hospitals and training
schools for delinquent girls were not run for profit, and thus were not proprietary
like the railroad in Parden. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. at 284
(distinguishing Parden).
54. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). Prior to Welch, but after the Employees of the Depart-
ment of Public Health decision, the Court clarified its position taken in Parden by
stating that "[t]he mere fact that a State participates in a program through which
[Vol. 43: p. 923
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sent to suit requires "an unequivocal expression that Congress intended to
override [the states'] Eleventh Amendment immunity."5 5
The Third Circuit synthesized Parden and its progeny into what it calls
the "Parden doctrine." 56 In College Savings Bank, the Third Circuit deter-
mined that a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity can be constructively
waived if the following factors are present:
(1) Congress enacts a law providing that a state will be deemed to
have waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity if it engages in
the activity covered by the federal legislation; (2) the law does so
through a clear statement that gives notice to the states; (3) a
state then engages in that activity covered by the federal legisla-
tion; and (4) the activity in question is not an important or core
government function. 57
In applying its test, the Third Circuit conceded that the first three prongs
of the test had already been satisfied.58 The court, however, determined
that Florida Prepaid's activities failed to satisfy prong four of the test be-
cause Florida Prepaid was involved in an important governmental func-
the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the State of a
system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to
be sued in the federal courts." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
55. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
56. See College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 363 (formulating Parden doctrine test for
cases where state's Eleventh Amendment immunity can be constructively waived).
College Savings Bank is the only contemporary Third Circuit case discussing the
Parden doctrine since the significant changes to the Supreme Court's approach to
constructive waiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. For a discussion
of this Supreme Court precedent, see supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
The only other relatively contemporary discussion of the Parden doctrine by
the Third Circuit is the dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Rosenn in Fitchik v. New
Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 671 (3d Cir. 1989) (Rosenn, J., dissent-
ing). In Fitchik, the majority did not have the opportunity to address the Parden
argument because it determined that the New Jersey Transit Rail Operation was
not an arm of the state that was entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See id. at 664 (finding that New Jersey Transit Rail Operation was not arm of state
and was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). For a discussion of the
arm of the state doctrine, see infra notes 74-85, 114-22 and accompanying text. In
his dissent, Judge Rosenn rejected the argument that New Jersey "constructively
waived its immunity when it chose to operate a railroad while Parden was the law of
the land." Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 672 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
57. College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 363. In formulating the test, the court specif-
ically declined to follow the district court's ruling that Seminole Tribe had "implicitly
overruled" Parden. See id. at 356 (declining to follow district court holding and
expressing "no opinion" on whether Seminole Tribe overruled Parden). The court
determined that "a court of appeals should be reluctant to hold that the Supreme
Court implicitly has overruled its own decision when the Court had an opportunity
to overrule the decision explicitly and did not do so." Id. at 365. But see Kish v.
Vemiero, 212 B.R. 808, 814-15 (D.N.J. 1997) (relying on district court opinion in
College Savings Bank to dismiss implied, Parden-type waiver).
58. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 363 (finding that if College Savings Bank
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tion.59 The court found that the important governmental function that
Florida Prepaid was involved in was education, a core function of state
government according to the Third Circuit.60 In reaching its conclusion,
the court took a very expansive view of "education" to include within its
function "the provision of education-related services."
6 1
2. Waiver of Immunity by Conduct in Litigation
The Supreme Court long ago held in Clark v. Barnara 2 that a state
may also waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by its conduct in fed-
eral litigation. 63 In Clark, the Court held that Rhode Island had volunta-
rily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by intervening in a suit in
federal court and asserting a claim against the fund in controversy.
6 4
Through the years, the Supreme Court has further elaborated on its hold-
ing in Clark. The Supreme Court has held that because the Eleventh
Amendment immunity issue "sufficiently partakes of the nature of ajuris-
dictional bar," a party can raise the issue at any time during the pendency
of a case.6 5 Accordingly, the Court has also found that "[t] he fact that the
59. See id. at 364 (agreeing with district court that Florida Prepaid was en-
gaged in important governmental function).
60. See id. (noting that education is perhaps most important function of state
and local governments) (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
61. Id. In finding that the service provided by Florida Prepaid was an impor-
tant governmental function, the court rejected College Savings Bank's argument
that distinguished between the goal of education and the function that Florida
Prepaid performs. See id. (rejecting appellant's argument). The court refused to
distinguish between the means of providing for an education and providing educa-
tion directly. See id.
62. 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
63. See id. at 44748 (finding that Rhode Island waived its Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity by intervening as claimant in federal court); see also Gunter v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1905) ("[W]here a state voluntarily
become[s] a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it
will be bound thereby, and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by
invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment.").
64. See Clark, 108 U.S. at 44748 (differentiating Clark from Georgia v. Jessup,
106 U.S. 458 (1882), where state "expressly declined to become a party to the
suit").
65. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1996) (noting that Eleventh
Amendment immunity could be raised at any time during pendency of case); Flor-
ida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.18 (1982) (same);
College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 365 (citing Florida Department of State and Edelman).
Consistent with this statement, the Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459 (1945), heard Indiana's Eleventh Amendment argument that was
made for the first time before the Supreme Court. See id. at 467 ("The Eleventh
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judi-
cial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising
under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the first time in this
Court.").
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State appeared and offered defenses on the merits does not foreclose con-
sideration of the Eleventh Amendment issue." 66
The Third Circuit interpreted this Supreme Court precedent in Col-
lege Savings Bank.67 There, the Third Circuit concluded that Florida Pre-
paid, as an arm of the State of Florida, had not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity "through its appearance in the litigation" or "by
failing initially to raise its Eleventh Amendment immunity defense."68 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that Florida Prepaid did not waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by filing a counterclaim in the suit.69
The Third Circuit's holding in College Savings Bank-that Florida Pre-
paid had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity through its con-
duct in the litigation-typifies the Third Circuit approach. 70 Generally,
courts in the Third Circuit have not found a waiver as a result of a state's
participation in litigation absent some evidence that the "state acted as an
affirmative participant rather than as a beleaguered defendant."7 1 Exam-
66. Florida Dep't of State, 458 U.S. at 683 n.18.
67. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 366 (reviewing relevant Supreme Court
precedent); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 414 (1996) (same), affid, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149).
68. College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 365. The Third Circuit similarly permitted a
belated claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity in Alessi v. Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, 893 F.2d 1444, 1453-54 (3d Cir. 1990). In Alessi, the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare ("DPW") asserted an Eleventh Amendment defense at the
preliminary hearing in the district court. See id. at 1454. The district court, how-
ever, rejected the assertion. See id. The Department of Public Welfare then failed
to reassert the immunity claim in its brief on appeal, but the Third Circuit none-
theless considered the issue. See id. The court concluded that "we cannot deem
[DPW] to have waived its Eleventh Amendment defense simply by failing to in-
clude it in its brief at this stage of the proceeding." Id.
69. See College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 365 (affirming district court ruling on
waiver through conduct in litigation). The court found that Florida Prepaid's con-
duct in the litigation as to both its assertion of a counterclaim and participation in
the litigation, as well as delaying an assertion of immunity, was warranted in light
of the pre-Florida Seminole Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 365-66 (noting that
Union Gas controlled at beginning of litigation).
70. For a general discussion of the Third Circuit approach to waiver through
conduct in litigation, see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
71. Unix Sys. Lab., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 790,
801 (D.N.J. 1993). In Unix System, the district court declined to find that California
had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity because it had not "acted as an
affirmative participant" when it had not counterclaimed, filed a third-party com-
plaint, removed the case to federal court or even answered the complaint. See id.
(noting that state had not acted as affirmative participant in litigation). Accord-
ingly, the court found that California "entered the action involuntarily, and it has
sought only to exit as quickly as possible for reasons unrelated to the merits"
through its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and motions to dis-
miss or transfer for inconvenient or improper venue. See id. at 801 & n.5 (discuss-
ing reasons why California had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Other cases have also found waiver to be conditioned on an affirmative action
by the state. See Kish v. Verniero, 212 B.R. 808, 814 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that
filing motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) is
1998]
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pies of such affirmative actions that the Third Circuit courts have found to
constitute waivers include entering into consent decrees and allowing a
judgment to become final without appealing the decision. 72 Also, the
courts have found that the Eleventh Amendment assertion is waived by
such affirmative actions as the filing of a proof of claim against a debtor's
estate in federal court.73
not sufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity); United States v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 939 F. Supp. 1157, 1162-63 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding that defensive inter-
vention of state in Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994), action does not waive
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity against counterclaims); Cuffeld v. Supreme
Court, 936 F. Supp. 266, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[M]ere fact that defendants ...
include[d] the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and its Justices is not an 'affirma-
tive action' on their part that could constitute waiver."); United States v. Wheaton
Indus., Civ. No. 90-3880 (CSF), 1991 WL 208877, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 1991) (find-
ing that defensive intervention of state in CERCLA action does not constitute
waiver of state's Eleventh Amendment immunity against counterclaims); see also
Radeschi v. Pennsylvania, 846 F. Supp. 416, 421 (W.D. Pa. 1993) ("[M]ere removal
of a case by state officials does not, without much more, waive the Eleventh
Amendment immunity."). But see Constitutional Defense Fund v. Humphrey, No.
ClV.A.92-396, 1992 WL 164734, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1992) (finding that Minne-
sota waived Eleventh Amendment claim by removing action to federal court).
72. See Mitchell v. Commission of Adult Entertainment Establishments, 12
F.3d 406, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that failure to appeal rejection of
Eleventh Amendment immunity assertion constituted waiver of immunity); Dela-
ware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470, 475 (3d
Cir. 1982) (finding that entry of consent judgment waived any Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity state may have previously desired to claim); Vecchione v. Wohlge-
muth, 558 F.2d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment
defense could be asserted for first time on appeal, but finding that immunity could
not be asserted when contention was not made until almost one year after final
judgment at contempt proceeding); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.,
834 F. Supp. 757, 763 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that entering into court decree
"waived any entitlement to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforcement
of that [d]ecree").
The Third Circuit has taken the view that a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity becomes final "at the latest" when a judgment has become final. See
Mitchell 12 F.3d at 408 (examining when waivers of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity become final) (citing Vecchione, 558 F.2d at 159). The court has appropriately
concluded that any other policy would relegate the court's decisions to the status
of "mere advisory opinions." See id. (discussing when Eleventh Amendment waiver
must become final) (citing Vecchione, 558 F.2d at 159).
73. See In reFennelly, 212 B.R. 61, 63-64 (D.N.J. 1997) (following majority view
that filing proof of claim constitutes waiver of state's sovereign immunity). The
court in Fennelly explicitly declined to follow the dicta of New Jersey v. Mocco, 206
B.R. 691 (D.N.J. 1997). See Fennelly, 212 B.R. at 64 (declining to follow Mocco dicta
in "face of substantial persuasive authority to the contrary"). The court in Mocco
stated in dicta that a state "would have retained its sovereign immunity if it had
appropriately filed a proof of claim." Mocco, 206 B.R. at 693. The Fennelly court,
however, concluded that it could not follow this dicta in light of the contrary ma-
jority view. See Fennelly, 212 B.R. at 64 (following majority view that filing proof of
claim constitutes waiver of state's sovereign immunity).
Further, the Third Circuit has established that a state's "general or voluntary
appearance in federal court" may waive that state's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 669 F.2d 142,
[Vol. 43: p. 923
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C. Arm of the State Doctrine: Which State Entities Can Assert the States'
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Often, the state is not the named party in an action.7 4 Nonetheless,
the Eleventh Amendment may bar the suit.75 The Supreme Court has
recognized that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits not only against
the state itself, but also against a subdivision of the state if the state re-
mains 'the real party in interest.' ,,76 The Court has found that a state is
the "real party in interest" whenever "'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public admin-
istration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Gov-
ernment from acting, or to compel it to act.' "'77
The Third Circuit's approach to the arm of the state doctrine must be
addressed here because the previously discussed waiver and abrogation
doctrines have no relevance in a suit against a state entity unless a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity attaches to that entity.78 In applying
Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit has developed two basic prin-
ciples. First, federal law determines whether a government entity is an
arm of the state entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. 79 Sec-
148 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, the District C6urt of NewJersey, applying this precedent
in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Gloucester Environmental Manage-
ment Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1995), concluded that New Jersey had
waived the Eleventh Amendment immunity of four of its state agencies that were
made third-party defendants in a suit brought by New Jersey that was removed to
federal court. See id. at 661 (noting that state's "voluntary invocation of the federal
court's power to adjudicate its rights may give rise to a waiver of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity").
Finally, nothing precludes a state from explicitly waiving its immunity to suit
in federal court through its constitution or by statute. See Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (noting that state statute or constitutional provi-
sion may waive state's Eleventh Amendment immunity). This waiver, however,
must be an "unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to federal-court jurisdic-
tion." Id.
74. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (noting that suit may still
be against state even though state is not named party).
75. See id. (finding that Eleventh Amendment may still apply if state is not
named party).
76. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400, 409 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663), aff'd, 131
F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S.Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-
149). For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting at this point that counties and
municipalities can not assert the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense enjoyed
by the states. See Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 1969)
(limiting scope of Eleventh Amendment protection in cases involving public
entities).
77. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 409 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.l (1984)).
78. See Zinn, supra note 14, at 1455 (noting that "[a] rm-of-the-state doctrine
determines whether immunity exists, whereas waiver and abrogation are only rele-
vant if immunity exists").
79. See Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir.
1995) (noting that question of whether commission is arm of state is one of federal
13
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ond, the Third Circuit has recognized that the entity asserting the Elev-
enth Amendment immunity has the burden of proving its existence.
8 0
In determining whether a state instrumentality qualifies as an arm of
the state, the Third Circuit initially adopted a multiple question balancing
test known as the Urbano factors. 8' For clarity's sake, the Third Circuit
eventually condensed these varied questions into a three-question balanc-
ing test in Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations.8 2 The three questions
explored in the Third Circuit test are:
(1) Whether the money that would pay the judgment would
come from the state (this includes three of the Urbano factors-
whether payment will come from the state's treasury, whether the
agency has the money to satisfy the judgment, and whether the
sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for the
agency's debts);
(2) The status of the agency under state law (this includes
four factors-how state law treats the agency generally, whether
the entity is separately incorporated, whether the agency can sue
or be sued in its own right, and whether it is immune from state
taxation); and
law); Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718, 722 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that whether agency
is alter ego of state is question of federal law, not state law) (citing Harris v. Penn-
sylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1332, 1334 n.1 (3d Cir. 1969)).
80. See Christy, 54 F.3d at 1144 (finding that party asserting Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity bears "burden of production and persuasion with respect to fac-
tual questions" proving applicability of Eleventh Amendment immunity). The
Christy court decided to treat the Eleventh Amendment assertion like an affirma-
tive defense. See id. (adopting United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit's
approach). Thus, the party that would benefit from the assertion bears the burden
of proving its existence. See id. (comparing Eleventh Amendment to affirmative
defense). Further, the court found that the Eleventh Amendment claim will "occa-
sion serious dispute only where a relatively complex institutional arrangement
makes it unclear whether a given entity ought to be treated as an arm of the state."
Id. Appropriately, the court found that in these "complex" situations, the particu-
lars of the arrangement will lie within the knowledge of the entity claiming the
immunity. See id. (justifying factually why court should treat Eleventh Amendment
assertion like affirmative defense).
81. See Urbano, 415 F.2d at 250-51 (adopting factors to determine whether en-
tity is arm of state). The original factors, none of which were dispositive of the arm
of the state issue, were: (1) "perhaps the most important is whether, in the event
plaintiff prevails, the payment of the judgment will have to be made out of the
state treasury"; (2) "whether the agency has the funds or the power to satisfy the
judgment"; (3) "whether the agency is performing a governmental or proprietary
function"; (4) "whether it has been separately incorporated"; (5) "the degree of
autonomy over its operations"; (6) "whether it has the power to sue and be sued
and to enter into contracts"; (7) "whether its property is immune from state taxa-
tion"; and (8) "whether the sovereign has immunized itself from responsibility for
the agency's operations." Id.
82. 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989).
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(3) What degree of autonomy the agency has.8 3
The Third Circuit has applied this test in cases since Fitchik, but the factors
have not been weighed evenly.8 4 In the vast majority of the cases, the first
factor-funding-has controlled the courts' analyses. 85
83. Id. at 659. Like the Third Circuit, other courts of appeals have also devel-
oped arm of the state tests for determining which government entities are entitled
to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Joseph Beckham, The Eleventh
Amendment Revisited: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Interpretations on the Immu-
nity of Public Colleges and Universities, 27 STETSON L. Rv. 141, 148 (1997) (noting
there is "confusing array of tests in lower federal courts" that consider "a range of
factors"); Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign
Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1243, 1243-44 (1992) (noting that lower courts have fashioned their own "dis-
similar, multi-factor tests ... which often ... vary on the relative weight of each
factor, and generate conflicting results"); see also V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1420-21 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting United States
Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit's approach to arm of state issue); Richardson
v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452-53 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) (setting forth United
States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit's approach to arm of state issue), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 858 (1998); Mumford v. Basinki, 105 F.3d 264, 268-69 (6th Cir.)
(stating United States Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit's approach to arm of state
issue), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 298 (1997); Harter v. C.D. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 340
(4th Cir. 1996) (noting United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit's ap-
proach), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2511 (1997); Thiel v. State Bar of Wis., 94 F.3d 399,
401 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating United States Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit's
approach); Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir.
1996) (applying United States Court of Appeals for Second Circuit's approach to
arm of state doctrine), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 481 (1996); Hadley v. North Arkansas
Community Technical College, 76 F.3d 1437, 1439 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting United
States Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit's approach), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1080
(1997); Cross v. Alabama State Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49
F.3d 1490, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating United States Court'of Appeals for Elev-
enth Circuit's approach to arm of state issue); University of Rhode Island v. A.W.
Chesterton Co., 2 F.3d 1200, 1205 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting United States Court of
Appeals for First Circuit's approach to issue); Morris v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218, 223-25 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying United States Court
of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit's approach to arm of state issue).
84. See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659 (noting that "these factors are not weighed
evenly" and most significant factor is whether any judgment would be paid from
state treasury).
85. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
131 F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999)
(No. 98-149) (adopting district court holding that Florida Prepaid was arm of State
of Florida); Christy, 54 F.3d at 1145, 1150 (finding that Pennsylvania Turnpike
Commission was not arm or alter ego of state after placing "special emphasis" on
funding factors on which commission failed to meet its burden of proof); Peters v.
Delaware River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1351 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Since two of the
three factors weigh heavily against a finding that the [Delaware River Port Author-
ity ("DRPA")] is an arm of a state, including the first and most important factor of
funding, the balance is clearly struck against a finding that the DRPA is an alter
ego of . . .New Jersey or Pennsylvania."); Bolden v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 821 (3d Cir. 1991) (affording funding factor most
weight in determining that Eleventh Amendment did not protect Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA")); Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664 (find-
ing that NewJersey Transit Corporation ("NJT"), and thus its subsidiary NewJersey
15
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Congressional Abrogation: Searching for a Fourteenth Amendment Source
for Legislation
The Seminole Tribe decision clearly limited the means by which Con-
gress could constitutionally abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity: Congress' intent to abrogate must be unequivocally clear and
Congress must have legislated pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment
powers.86 The first prong of the test severely limits practitioners attempt-
Transit Rail Operations, was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection as
arm of state even though last two factors -status under state law and autonomy-
supported conclusion that NJT was New Jersey's alter ego when funding prong
"provide[d] extremely strong indication that NJT is not the alter ego of New
Jersey"); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, No.
CIV.A.86-5357, 1997 WL 597963, at *6-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1997) (finding that
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission was not arm of state when final two factors
favored finding of entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity, but most im-
portant factor, funding, weighed against finding commission was arm of state);
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F.
Supp. 400, 413 (D.NJ. 1996) ("Since the most important factor, funding, weighs
heavily in favor of Florida Prepaid . . . the balance is clearly struck in favor of
finding that Florida Prepaid enjoys sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of
Florida."), aff'd, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S.
Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester
Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 651, 659-60 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding
that "most important factor," funding, militates against holding that Rowan Col-
lege and Trenton State College were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,
but finding that funding factor required that Ancora Psychiatric Hospital and
Trenton State Hospital be immune from suit in federal court); see also Kovats v.
Rutgers, 822 F.2d 1303, 1312 (3d Cir. 1987) (weighing Urbano factors and conclud-
ing that Rutgers University could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity);
Skehan v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 F.2d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 1987) (concluding
that state system was entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection after weighing
pre-Fitchik and Urbano factors); Blake v. Cline, 612 F.2d 718, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding funding factor to be most important in arm of state analysis); DeSantis v.
Ricci, 614 F. Supp. 415, 420 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that Meadowlands Sports Au-
thority is not arm of state for Eleventh Amendment purposes primarily because of
its financial independence). But see CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. ALZA Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 614, 625 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that University of California is entitled to
assert Eleventh Amendment Immunity "particular[ly]" due to its status under state
law).
The special emphasis placed on the funding factor is justified in light of the
Eleventh Amendment's central goal: "the prevention of federal court judgments
that must be paid out of the State's treasury." Christy, 54 F.3d at 1145. In some
cases, the entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity is clear and warrants lit-
tle discussion by the courts. See, e.g., Kish v. Verniero, 212 B.R. 808, 814 (D.N.J.
1997) (accepting New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles as real party in interest
that could assert Eleventh Amendment claim); Oley Township v. Delaware River
Basin Comm'n, 906 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Since [the Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP")] is an agency under the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania's control . . . the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs suit against
DEP in federal court.").
86. For a discussion of Seminole Tribe, see supra notes 18-27 and accompanying
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ing to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment. The language of the statute
must unequivocally abrogate; otherwise, abrogation is not possible. 87 The
Third Circuit has already recognized that in applying the first prong of the
test, the court's analysis cannot encompass any analogy or policy consider-
ations.88 Thus, a proponent of abrogation must rely solely on the bare
language of the statute.89
Assuming that Congress has expressed its unequivocal intent to abro-
gate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the proponent of abroga-
tion will likely be confronted with a statute enacted pursuant to Congress'
Article I powers.90 Further, many federal statutes give exclusive jurisdic-
tion over causes of action to federal courts.91 Thus, access to the courts
often depends upon a finding that the statute somehow implicates an in-
terest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 92
The Third Circuit has concluded that a mere mention of the Four-
teenth Amendment in the legislative history, although entitled to some
deference, does not conclusively show that the legislation was, at least in
part, enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 93 The court in
College Savings Bank, however, showed a willingness to search for potential
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.9 4 The proponent of
87. See College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 357 (noting that Congress must express
unequivocal intent to abrogate to satisfy first prong of abrogation test).
88. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1996)
(finding that analysis cannot "expand to encompass the analogy and policy consid-
erations that plaintiffs now urge"); see also Cloherty, supra note 3, at 1305-06 (not-
ing that any evidence contained in legislative history of federal statute favoring
abrogation is irrelevant). The court also noted that it could not act as a "super
legislature" and read any language that Congress did not enact into a statute at
issue. See Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 696 (limiting statute to its explicit language).
89. See, e.g., Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 696 (limiting analysis to explicit language of
statute).
90. See Beckham, supra note 83, at 159-60 (noting that Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Seminole Tribe will have little impact on federal laws extending to civil rights
and prohibiting discrimination). Federal laws such as bankruptcy, copyrights, anti-
trust, patent and CERCLA were all enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I powers,
and thus their abrogation clauses are all affected by the Seminole Tribe decision. See
id. at 160 (noting effect of decision on broad range of federal laws); Williamson,
supra note 7, at 1740 (stating that federal bankruptcy, intellectual property and
environmental statutes are repeatedly mentioned as "likely victims" of Seminole
Tribe).
91. See Beckham, supra note 83, at 160 (noting that federal bankruptcy, copy-
right, antitrust and CERCLA laws grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction).
92. See id. (requiring that courts may still find that Article I statutes "em-
brac[e] enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment").
93. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
131 F.3d 353, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that although brief statement of con-
stitutional foundation for TRCA in Senate Report is entitled to deference, it does
not establish that TRCA was enacted pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No. 98-149).
94. See id. at 358-62 (examining whether right to be free from false advertising
was protected by Fourteenth Amendment).
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abrogation must seize upon these interests to argue abrogation
successfully.
9 5
Although the court in College Savings Bank determined that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not protect the right to be free from false advertis-
ing, and thus that the TRCA did not constitutionally abrogate Florida's
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the particular facts, the court rec-
ognized that trademark infringement claims or other false advertising
claims may implicate intangible property rights protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 96 Various commentators have recognized the merits
of attempting to circumvent the harsh effects of Seminole Tribe through
attempts at identifying affected property rights and interests protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to argue that a valid abrogation has oc-
curred.9 7 This approach affords the only opportunity to gain access to the
federal courts by means of an abrogation argument.98
B. Constructive Waiver Under the Parden Doctrine: Still a Viable Argument
in the Third Circuit
In College Savings Bank, the Third Circuit declined to follow the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey's finding that
95. See id. (noting that whether legislation was enacted under Fourteenth
Amendment turned on whether specific interest is protected by Fourteenth
Amendment).
96. See id. at 362 (limiting holding to particular facts of case).
97. See Beckham, supra note 83, at 160 (stating that courts could construe
Article I legislation to embrace enforcement powers of Fourteenth Amendment);
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that Fourteenth Amendment is likely to be
used as means of abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent infringe-
ment suits); Vasquez, supra note 7, at 1691 (noting that litigants must search for
property rights protected by Fourteenth 'Amendment in form of mandatory obliga-
tions placed on states by Congress under its Article I powers); see also College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 425-
26 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding that patent is property for purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment and that Congress can accordingly abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity of states for claims under Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1994)), affd,
131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1999) (No.
98-149).
For instance, one can argue that Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amend-
ment powers when it abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the Patent Act. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 4-5 (summarizing abrogation argu-
ment under Patent Act after Seminole Tribe decision). The argument is:
(1) [Platents are property; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
states from depriving people of property without due process of law; and.
(3) section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the powers
to enact legislation enforcing the Amendment. Therefore, the argument
continues, Congress drew on its Fourteenth Amendment powers when it
abrogated state sovereign immunity to protect individuals' intellectual
property from state infringement, so abrogation was properly effected.
Id.
98. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's limitation of Congress' abroga-
tion powers to legislation enacted under Congress' Fourteenth Amendment pow-
ers, see supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court had overruled the Parden constructive waiver doctrine
through the Seminole Tribe decision.99 Despite the Third Circuit's recogni-
tion of the current validity of the Parden doctrine, the reality still remains
that the Supreme Court has only once found a constructive waiver of a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity through participation in an area
regulated by Congress-in Parden.10 0 Indeed, many commentators be-
lieve that the constructive waiver doctrine articulated in Parden and its
progeny is dead.10 1
Despite this less than glowing endorsement by commentators of the
vitality of Parden constructive waiver, the Third Circuit has nevertheless
fashioned a Parden doctrine test that remains good law. 10 2 Thus, although
it appears that it will be difficult to advocate that Parden constructive
waiver has occurred, the Third Circuit has left room for developing con-
crete arguments under the test.' 0
3
In College Savings Bank, the court conceded the satisfaction of the first
three elements of the test.10 4 In practice, an abrogation argument will
determine the existence of the first two elements of the Parden doctrine
test-the existence of a clear congressional statement of intent to make
99. Compare College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 365 (stating that courts of appeal
should not find that Supreme Court implicitly overruled its own decision), with
College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 416 (finding that after Seminole Tribe, "Congress
may no longer utilize its Article I powers to elicit a waiver of sovereign immunity as
a condition for participating in a field subject to congressional regulation").
100. See College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 416 (stating that no other Supreme
Court decision has found waiver under Parden theory); Wolf, supra note 47, at 93
(noting that Supreme Court has never cited to Parden theory in any subsequent
case); Brad Jolly, Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Pol-
icy of Termination Continues, 29 Amiz. ST. L.J. 273, 317 n.348 (1997) (noting that
Supreme Court has only found Parden type waiver once).
101. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 410 (noting that constructive waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity is virtually nonexistent); Ann Althouse, Wen to
Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
1123, 1167 (1989) (finding Parden constructive waiver to be "virtual nullity"); Ron
S. Chun, Avoiding a Jurassic Dinosaur Run Amok: Circumventing Eleventh Amendment
Sovereign Immunity to Remedy Violations of the Automatic Stay, 98 COM. L.J. 179, 202
(1993) (finding constructive waiver to be "effectively dead"); ChristopherJohnsen,
Immunity Law in Higher Education: A Review of the 1995 Judicial Decisions, 23 J.C. &
U.L. 333, 339 (1997) (determining that it is doubtful that constructive waiver sur-
vived Seminole Tribe decision); Wolf, supra note 47, at 89 (concluding that construc-
tive Parden-type waiver is "without bite"); Wastewin, supra note 3, at 529
(concluding that only express consent to suit by states will constitute waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Schwartz, supra note 3, at 4 (noting un-
certainty over whether Parden constructive waiver survived Seminole Tribe); Jolly,
supra note 100, at 316-18 (finding slight possibility of constructive waiver through
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
102. See College Say. Bank, 131 F.3d at 363 (formulating Parden doctrine test for
constructive waiver in Third Circuit).
103. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to Parden constructive
waiver, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
104. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 363 (finding that first three prongs of
test already have or will be met).
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the states subject to suit.10 5 Thus, it seems that in the typical situation, the
proponents of abrogation in the Third Circuit by means of the Parden doc-
trine will have to win their arguments by establishing the nonexistence of
the fourth prong-the important or core government function. 10 6 Even
though the Third Circuit has taken a very broad approach to this impor-
tant or core government function, as evidenced by its incorporation of
education-related services into its interpretation of "education" in College
Savings Bank, the fourth prong has left sufficient room for a party propo-
nent to advocate the nonexistence of an important or core government
function.107
C. Constructive Waiver Through Conduct in Litigation: A Means of Arguing
Eleventh Amendment Immunity Has Been Lost
The Third Circuit has recognized in a number of cases that a state
can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity through its conduct in litiga-
tion.' 0 8 A proponent could use this type of waiver if abrogation and con-
structive waiver arguments fail or if the state has not expressly consented
to suit.10 9
The key to winning a waiver by conduct argument in the Third Cir-
cuit lies in identifying an affirmative action on the part of the state, or
state entity entitled to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity, suggesting
that a waiver has occurred.1 10 The most obvious signal that a state has
waived its immunity, and thus that a waiver argument should be made,
occurs when the state or its entities actually take advantage of a federal
court's power to adjudicate rights by filing suit in federal court.1 11 The
105. For a discussion of the elements of an abrogation argument, see supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
106. See College Sav. Bank, 131 F.3d at 363 (addressing application of fourth
prong of Parden doctrine test).
107. See id. at 364-65 (rejecting narrow application of "important or core gov-
ernment function" prong of Parden doctrine test).
108. For a discussion of cases in which the Third Circuit has found a waiver
through a state's conduct in litigation, see supra notes 67-73 and accompanying
text.
109. See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chap-
ter, 70 AM. BANiu. L.J. 195, 209 (1996) (noting that plaintiff should explore
whether state has consented to suit by another means in cases lacking express con-
sent). For a discussiob of the Third Circuit's approach to congressional abroga-
tion and constructive waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see supra notes
29-45, 56-61, 67-73 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Unix Sys. Lab., Inc. v. Berkeley Software Design, Inc., 832 F.
Supp. 790, 801 (D.N.J. 1993) (declining to find California had waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity without first finding state "acted as an affirmative partici-
pant" in litigation); see also Gibson, supra note 109, at 209 (finding that affirmative
action on part of state is required to find waiver by conduct in litigation).
111. See, e.g., In reFennelly, 212 B.R. 61, 63-64 (D.N.J. 1997) (following major-
ity view that filing proof of claim in federal bankruptcy court constitutes waiver of
state's sovereign immunity); see also Patricia L. Barsalou, Defining the Limits of Federal
Court Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy Court, 28 ST. MARY's L.J. 575, 615 (1997)
942 [Vol. 43: p. 923
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Third Circuit has, however, identified less conspicuous actions as affirma-
tive actions signifying a waiver.112 Thus, the key to demonstrating waiver
by conduct lies in establishing an arguable affirmative state action in con-
formity with the policy justifications of waiver by conduct, and in arguing
that the state can no longer play the role of the "beleaguered defendant"
in a federal forum because of its affirmative action. 113
D. Arm of the State Doctrine: Avoiding the Complex Doctrines of Abrogation
and Constructive Waiver
The arm of the state analysis can be a very powerful tool for a practi-
tioner who maintains that the Eleventh Amendment should not bar a suit
against a state entity.1 14 Practitioners need not rely on abstract "pigeon
holed" doctrines such as abrogation and waiver if they can successfully
argue that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not attachto the defend-
ant entity.1
15
In the Third Circuit, a party must emphasize two aspects of the arm of
the state analysis in asserting that Eleventh Amendment immunity does
not attach to a state entity. First, the Third Circuit has, held that the entity
asserting its entitlement to the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity has
the burden of proof on the issue.'1 6 This burden requirement is very im-
(noting that courts have traditionally held that states constructively waive immunity
for counterclaims arising out of same transaction or occurrences asserted against
states defensively when states filed claims in bankruptcy court); Chun, supra note
101, at 200-01 (finding crucial question to be whether state sought adjudication or
determination of its rights in federal court).
112. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 678
F.2d 470, 475 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that entry of consent judgment constituted
waiver of any Eleventh Amendment immunity that state may have previously de-
sired to claim); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 834 F. Supp. 757, 763
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that entering into court decree waived Eleventh Amend-
ment defense to enforcement of decree); Constitutional Defense Fund v.
Humphrey, No. CIV.A.92-396, 1992 WL 164734, at *2 (E.D. Pa.July 2, 1992) (find-
ing that Minnesota waived Eleventh Amendment claim by removing action to fed-
eral court); see also Unix Sys., 832 F. Supp. at 801 (recognizing that counterclaim,
third-party complaint or removal may constitute affirmative actions signaling
waiver).
113. See Unix Sys., 832 F. Supp. at 801 (finding that all cases cited by plaintiff
to establish waiver involved state acting as affirmative participant in litigation
rather than as "beleaguered defendant").
114. See Christopher Buchholtz, Note, The King Can Do No Wrong: How the
Harter v. Vernon Court Ignored Confusing Precedent and Simplified the Analysis Required
to Determine Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 75 N.C. L. REv. 2281, 2299 (1997) (not-
ing that crucial classification of entity as arm of state often determines outcome of
many Eleventh Amendment immunity cases).
115. See Zinn, supra note 14, at 1456 (stating that arm of state doctrine deter-
mines whether Eleventh Amendment immunity exists, whereas waiver and abroga-
tion are only relevant if immunity exists).
116. See Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding that "party asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity.., bears
the burden of proving its applicability").
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portant because in the absence of clear evidence relevant to an arm of the
state factor, that factor is not deemed "irrelevant" for purposes of the in-
quiry, but rather signifies that the proponent has failed to satisfy its bur-
den.1 1 7 This burden placed on the proponent affords the other party
ample room to attack the proponent's evidence. For example, when ana-
lyzing the funding factor, the Third Circuit has been reluctant to draw
inferences from raw data offered by the proponent. 118 Thus, in various
cases, the Third Circuit has not afforded any weight to figures offered by
the proponent representing large amounts of funds received from the
state when the entity has not shown what percentage of the entity's total
funds came from the state. 119
Second, it is evident that the Third Circuit has placed the greatest
emphasis on the funding factor when considering whether an entity has a
right to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 120 Accordingly, in many arm of
the state analyses, the funding factor analysis determined the outcome. 1 21
Thus, when coupled with a state entity's burden of proving that Eleventh
Amendment immunity attaches, a strong funding factor analysis or an at-
tack on the adequacy of an entity's proof seems like the clearest means of
avoiding an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit in federal court.122
117. See id. at 1146 (finding that lack of evidence bearing on how much
money commission had available to satisfy potential judgment meant that commis-
sion had failed to meet its burden on issue).
118. See id. at 1145 & n.6 (declining to draw conclusion from evidence that
commission received over $112 million in tax revenue from state).
119. See id. (refusing to draw conclusion from evidence that commission had
received over $112 million from state because commission failed to provide evi-
dence regarding percentage of annual revenues received from state); Bolden v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1991)
(finding that impact of new law affording state funds to SEPTA was too uncertain
to be given significant weight in funding analysis without knowing what percentage
of SEPTA's total revenue came from state funds).
120. For a discussion of the funding factor and its importance, see supra note
85 and accompanying text. Many commentators have also recognized that the
funding factor is often the most important factor in the arm of the state analysis.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, at 388 (finding that whether "a judgment against
the entity [will] be satisfied with funds in the state treasury" is "especially" impor-
tant);Johnsen, supra note 101, at 342 (noting "special emphasis" in Third Circuit
on potential state liability for judgments against state entities); Buchholtz, supra
note 114, at 2299 (finding funding factor preeminent in arm of state analysis);
James A. Rogers et al., CERCLA Claims Under Section 103 Versus 113: The State Law-
yers Perspective in an Uncertain Field, NAAG NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Dec.
1996-Jan. 1997, at 3, 11 (recognizing that most important factor is whether judg-
ment would be paid by state); Rogers, supra note 83, at 1292 (noting that many
courts have recognized importance of funding factor).
121. For a discussion of cases that involve the arm-of-the-state analysis and rely
heavily on the funding factor, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
122. See Beckham, supra note 83, at 147 (noting that "[s]tate entities cannot
always be placed squarely in the arm of the state" category, necessitating "fact-
intensive inquiry"); Rogers, supra note 83, at 1273 (explaining that arm of state
doctrine is dependent on "highly factual inquiry").
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IV. CONCLUSION
Application of the Eleventh Amendment is often complex and incon-
sistent2 23 The successful assertion of an Eleventh Amendment defense by
a party defendant, however, can have dramatic results on the litigation.
Such results may include the closing of federal courthouse doors on those
seeking relief against a state or even a complete bar to suit if the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the action. 124 The Third Circuit
thus affords litigants various methods by which they can avoid the often
harsh consequences of an Eleventh Amendment immunity assertion.
These methods include the abrogation, waiver and arm of the state doc-
trines. 125 Although these doctrines can be used equally by state defend-
ants to shield themselves from liability, they afford an opportunity for
litigants to obtain successfully the relief sought for injuries incurred at the
hands of a state or state entity.
Joseph A. Powers
123. For a discussion of commentators' reactions to the complexity of the
Eleventh Amendment, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
124. See Beckham, supra note 83, at 160 (noting that federal bankruptcy, copy-
right, antitrust and CERCLA laws grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction).
125. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to the abrogation doc-
trine, see supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third
Circuit's approach to waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see supra notes
46-73 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to
the arm of the state doctrine, see supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text.
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